The Minnesota Marketable Title Act: Anaylsis and Argument for Revision by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1969
The Minnesota Marketable Title Act: Anaylsis and
Argument for Revision
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Minnesota Marketable Title Act: Anaylsis and Argument for Revision" (1969). Minnesota Law
Review. 2946.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2946
1004
The Minnesota Marketable Titie Act: Analysis
and Argument for Revision
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of time with its consequent lengthening of title
records, and the preservation of minor recorded deed defects-a
basis for objections by meticulous title examiners'-spur the need
to reform both the mechanics and substantive law embracing
the examination of titles.2  Such reform has been initiated by
the so-called "marketable title acts,"3 which attempt to stabilize
the record by extinguishing ancient irregularities in the chain
of title.4  Generally the acts provide that claims or interests
arising prior to a designated period5 are extinguished unless
the claimant has filed a preserving notice before the statutory
1. These record errors have become especially troublesome since
the case of Douglass v. Ransom, 205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931),
which held that such trifling discrepancies as the spelling of names,
failure of wives to join in conveyances, unsatisfied or defectively satis-
fied old mortgages, and improper descriptions in the record made the
title unmarketable.
2. See, e.g., P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLEs, ch. 9 (1953, Supp.
1966); L. SIIEs & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY
LEGISLATiON 3 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SIMEs & TAYLOR]; Aigler,
Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MICH L. REV. 185 (1951);
Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CoRNLL
L. REV. 45 (1967); Bayse, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title
Acts, 47 IowA L. REV. 261 (1962); Payne, The Crisis in Conveyancing, 19
Mo. L. REV. 214, 215 (1954); Comment, 10 ALA. L. REV. 415 (1958);
Comment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 841 (1966). But cf. Harbert, The Need for a
Complete Abstract of Title, 31 TITLE NEWS 3 (Oct. 1952).
3. Marketable title acts have been enacted in 13 states: FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 712.01-.10 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83 §§ 12.1-.4(Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1101 to -1110 (Bum's Supp.
1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 614.17-.20 (Supp. 1968); M CH. COMP. L. ANN.§8 565.101-.109 (1967); Ann. STAT. § 541.023 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT.
8§ 76-288 to -298 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (Supp.
1960); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-56 (Page's Supp. 1967); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 71-81 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE §§ 51.16B01-.16B14
(Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to -10 (1963, Supp. 1967); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.15 (1966). For a discussion of the acts in general, see
authorities cited in note 2 supra, and comprehensive bibliographies in
SIMES & TAYLOR, 359-61, and Barnett, supra note 2, at 47 n.6.
4. See Swenson, The Utah Marketable Title Act, 8 UTAH L. REV.
201 (1963). Thus, overly cautious title examiners will at least have to
confine their "fly-specking" to a comparatively short period of time.
5. The statutory period varies among the several states from 20
years in North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (Supp. 1960), to 50
years in Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1101 (Bum's Supp. 1968), with 40
years being the most popular period. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 83§ 12.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MICH. Comep. L. ANN. § 565.101 (1967);
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period has run.6
Marketable title acts are of two types. The limitations-
type acts7 disallow the commencement of any action on a claim
arising prior to a designated time in the past, unless the claim
has been preserved by filing notice.s The effectiveness of such
acts is somewhat incomplete in that instead of destroying ancient
claims, they only bar the remedy otherwise available to the
claimant.
The marketable-type acts declare the record owner the holder
of a marketable title which is free of all interests arising more
than a specified number of years ago, providing such interests
have not been kept alive by the recording of a preserving no-
tice.0 The marketable title defined by these acts is not neces-
sarily one that will satisfy a contract of sale; that is, it is not the
type of title which one could force on a vendee through specific
performance, as these acts provide for a number of exceptions
which will not appear on the record.10 However, when such
acts operate in favor of a fee simple and none of the exceptions
exist, the 40 year chain of title is commercially marketable in
all respects."
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.48 (Page's Supp. 1967). Iowa periodically
re-enacts its statute with the current Act applying to claims arising
prior to January 1, 1950. IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.17 (Supp. 1968).
6. See Snwxs & TAYLOR at 4; Bayse, supra note 2; Simes, The Im-
provement of Conveyancing: Recent Developments, 34 OxLA. BAR ASS'N
J. 2357 (1963).
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83 §§ 12.1-.4 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IowA CODE
ANN. §§ 614.17-.20 (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.15 (1966) are
examples of the limitations-type of act.
8. One commentator suggests that these acts are not really stat-
utes of limitations at all since (1) the person who is barred by the
particular act's provisions may never have had any cause of action at
all, and (2) the period of the statute may not start from the accrual of
any cause of action. See L. SIM~s, A HANDBOOK FOR MoRE EFFICIENT
CONVEYANCING 43 (1961).
9. Examples of the marketable-type acts are FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
712.01-.10 (Supp. 1968); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.1101 to .1110 (Burn's
Supp. 1968); MICa. ComP. L. ANN. §§ 565.101-.109 (1967); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11
(Supp. 1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Page's Supp. 1967);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 71-81 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE §§ 51.16
B01-.16B14 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to -10 (Supp.
1967).
10. E.g., Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957)
(where the rights of the holders of certain easements, mortgagors,
and the reversioners of leases are exempted from operation of the Act);
MIm. STAT. § 541.023(6) (1967) (where the rights of the federal govern-
ment and persons in possession of real estate are exempted from the
Act).
11. See SIvmsEs & TAYLOR at 305; Simes, supra note 6, at 2359.
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It has been more than 20 years since the Minnesota Market-
able Title Act 12 was adopted in its current form. The Act is
generally accepted as an aid in examining title, due to title
examiners' reliance on a search of the record covering only the
12. MiNN. STAT. § 541.023 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Act]:
1. Commencement. As against a claim of title based upon a
source of title, which source has then been of record at least
40 years, no action affecting the possession or title of any real
estate shall be commenced by a person, partnership, corpora-
tion, state, or any political division thereof, after January 1,
1948, to enforce any right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien
founded upon any instrument, event or transaction which was
executed or occurred more than 40 years prior to the com-
mencement of such action, unless within 40 years after such
execution or occurrence there has been recorded in the office of
the register of deeds or filed in the office of the registrar of
titles in the country in which the real estate affected is situ-
ated, a notice sworn to by the claimant or his agent or attor-
ney setting forth the name of the claimant, a description of the
real estate affected and of the instrument, event or transaction
on which such claim is founded, and stating whether the
right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien is mature or imma-
ture. If such notice relates to vested or contingent rights claimed
under a condition subsequent or restriction it shall affirmatively
show why such condition or restriction is not, or has not be-
come nominal so that it may be disregarded under the provi-
sions of Minnesota Statutes 1945, Section 500.20, Subdivision 1.
2. Application. This section shall apply to every right,
claim, interest, incumbrance or lien founded upon any instru-
ment, event or transaction 40 years old at the date hereof, or
which will be 40 years old prior to January 1, 1948, except
those under which the claimant thereunder shall file a notice as
herein provided prior to January 1, 1948.
5. Abandonment presumed. Any claimant under any in-
strument, event or transaction barred by the provisions of this
section shall be conclusively presumed to have abandoned all
right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien based upon such
instrument, event or transaction; and the title in the name of
any adverse claimant to the real estate which would otherwise
be affected thereby shall not be deemed unmarketable by reason
of the existence of such instrument, event or transaction; it
being hereby declared as the policy of the State of Minnesota
that, except as herein provided, ancient records shall not fetter
the marketability of real estate.
6. Limitations; certain titles not affected. This section
shall not affect any rights of the Federal government; nor in-
crease the effect as notice, actual or constructive, of any in-
strument now of record; nor bar the rights of any person, part-
nership or corporation in possession of real estate. ...
7. Source of title. For the purposes of this section, the
words "source of title" as used in subdivision 1 hereof shall
mean any deed, judgment, decree, sheriff's certificate, or other
instrument which transfers or confirms, or purports to transfer
or confirm, a fee simple title to real estate, including any such
instrument which purports to transfer, or to confirm the trans-
fer of a fee simple title from a person who was not the record
owner of the real estate. However, any such instrument which
purports to transfer, or to confirm the transfer of, a fee simple
title from a person who was not the record owner of the real
estate to the grantee or transferee named in such instrument
1006 [Vol. 53:1004
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last 40 years.'3 Such reliance is often not justified, however, as
numerous exceptions are either expressed in the Act or judicially
incorporated. In addition, an ancient preservation notice may re-
main effective for a period exceeding 40 years. Also, certain
conceptual and practical difficulties pervade the Act. This Note
will point out the difficulties both inherent in the Act and re-
sultant from judicial interpretation. The Note will also recom-
mend replacing the current Act with the Model Marketable Title
Act and specified variations thereof.
II. THE MINNESOTA ACT-INCONGRUOUS RESULTS
The Minnesota Act provides that an action to "enforce any
right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien" which is more than
40 years old, may not be brought against a "claim of title based
upon a source of title" which is also at least 40 years old.14 If
neither an action has been commenced nor a preserving notice
filed 15 within the 40 year period, the claim or interest is pre-
shall be deemed a source of title "of record at least 40 years"
within the meaning of subdivision 1 only if, during the period of
40 years after it was recorded, the following two conditions are
fulfilled: (1) another instrument was recorded which purports
to transfer a fee simple title from said grantee or transferee to
another person and (2) no instrument was recorded which pur-
ports to be or confirm a transfer of any interest in the real
estate by or from whoever was the record owner in fee simple
immediately before the commencement of said period of 40
years. The purpose of the next preceding sentence is to limit
the effect of erroneous descriptions or accidental conveyances.
Amending MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (1947); (1959).
13. See REPORT OF THE COMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANC-
ING AND RECORDING PRACTICES, ABA SECTION OF REAL PRoPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAW 102-05 (Proceedings 1956).
The Act has been supplemented by Standard No. 61 of the Minne-
sota Standards for Title Examination which reads as follows:
A fee simple title ... which is derived from a source which
has been of record at least 40 years shall not be considered
unmarketable by reason of any adverse right, including llens,
rights of re-entry, possibilities of reverter, and other interests,
claims, encumbrances and estates, founded upon any instrument
which was executed, or any event which occurred, more than
40 years before the date of examination unless(a) the owner of such adverse right has either filed notice
thereof as provided in M.S.A. Sec. 541.023 or commenced
an action to enforce the right, or(b) the owner of such adverse right is in possession of
the real estate, or
(e) *such adverse right is preserved by Subd. 6 of M.S.A.
Sec. 541.023....
14. Mxmx. STAT. § 541.023(1) (1967).
15. Id. It should be noted that Mx-x. STAT. § 541.023 (6) (1967)
exempts the claimant from filing a notice of his interest if he is in
possession; in effect, possession is another method of giving notice and
will be considered as such.
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sumed to have been abandoned. 16 Assume that in 1920, 0 con-
veys to A a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. A
enters possession and subsequently violates the condition in 1968.
Unless 0 has filed a preserving notice of the condition subse-
quent within the 40 year period beginning in 1920, he is now
barred from asserting the claim and is presumed to have
abandoned it.
The Act received substantial interpretation in Wichelman
v. Messner.17 In this leading case, 0 conveyed in 1897 a portion
of his farm to a school district with a provision for reverter18
should the land cease to be used for school purposes. The school
district discontinued its use of the land for school purposes in
1946, and in 1952 sold the land to the defendant, Messner.
Wichelman, the plaintiff, then solicited and obtained releases
of deeds from O's heirs and instituted an action to determine
adverse claims. Reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held19 that since no preserving notice
had been filed within 40 years from the creation of the condi-
tion, plaintiff was barred from asserting the claim.
The Wichelman court went further, however, concerning it-
self with many problems expressed by amici curiae counsel and
the Minnesota Bar.20 The court delineated three classes of per-
sons immune from the act:2' those whose right, claim, interest,
incumbrance or lien arose within 40 years prior to the commence-
ment of the action; 22 those who had filed preserving notices of
their claims within 40 years after their inception; 23 and those
excepted from the Act's operation, including those in possession
of the property. In its present form, the Act is a combination
16. Id. § 541.023(5).
17. 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). For a law review interpre-
tation and discussion of the constitutionality of the Act, see Note, Limi-
tations of Actions Affecting Titles to Real Estate-Examination of Titles
-Effect of Laws of Minnesota 1947 Chapter 118, 33 1Mnnm. L. Rav. 54
(1948).
18. The court stated that it was immaterial whether the provision
was deemed a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent or a fee
simple determinable, since the Act applied with equal force to both
types of restrictions, Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 96-97, 83
N.W.2d 800, 810 (1957).
19. A petition for rehearing was filed and supported by counsel
amici curiae from all over the state. The court affirmed its decision
but substituted for its earlier opinion the one which was eventually re-
ported. The reported opinion fully discusses the Act.
20. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
21. Id. at 112, 83 N.W.2d at 819-20.
22. See MnN. STAT. § 541.023 (1) (1967).
23. Id.
1008 [Vol. 53:1004
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
of the limitations-type act and the marketable-type act.24  It
operates as the former in that it requires the filing of notice to
preserve a right of action which is over 40 years old.25 It oper-
ates as the latter since all claims or interests to which the stat-
ute applies are conclusively presumed to be abandoned absent
the filing of any notice.2  Thus, in addition to precluding ac-
tions resting on ancient claims, the Act embraces a curative
function by extinguishing interests not seasonably filed.27
This combination can lead to possible absurdities if the stat-
ute is literally applied. For example, assume two claimants each
have interests of equal duration over 40 years old, neither being
in possession and neither having filed notice of his claim. Both
claimants would be barred under subdivision 1, the limitations
section. Therefore, subdivision 5, the abandonment section,
would become applicable and if literally applied both parties
would be presumed to have abandoned their interests. Further-
more, the mere application of subdivision 1 leads to results
equally undesirable. Hereunder, a party attempting an action
for determination of title will automatically lose his interest.
Thus, in such a situation, the party maneuvering himself into
the position of a defendant is always the victor. This difficulty
is illustrated by adjusting the Wichelman facts to a slightly
different setting. Assume that in 1946 the school board dis-
continued using the land for school purposes and thereafter
merely abandoned possession rather than selling to Messner.
Since neither party is in possession nor has filed a notice pre-
serving his claim, a presumption would lie under subdivision 5
that both parties have abandoned their interests. If Wichelman,
plaintiff in the actual case, had subsequently entered possession,
the school board would then have had to commence an action to
remove him and would have been barred by subdivision 1 of the
Act. Therefore, Wichelman, in the position of a defendant,
would automatically prevail.
There are situations, however, in which the Act, rather than
merely barring claims, operates as a true marketable title act.
Assume X has a claim which is based upon a title of record for
more than 40 years, and he has either filed notice of his interest
or is in possession. If Y has an adverse interest which is also
24. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 106, 83 N.W.2d 800,
816 (1957).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (1) (1967).
26. Id. § 541.023(5).
27. Snvims & TAYLOR at 336.
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older than 40 years, but has failed to file notice of his interest,
subdivision 5 extinguishes his claim since he would be barred
from suing X by subdivision 1. It is not necessary that a suit
be brought by either party as the adverse claim is automatically
extinguished.28
Another situation in which the Act operates as a market-
able-type occurs when X has an interest less than 40 years old
but based upon a source of title of record at least 40 years, while
Y has a conflicting interest which is over 40 years old. X is not
barred by the Act from bringing suit, since his interest is less
than 40 years old. However, it is not necessary for X to com-
mence an action, since if Y is not in possession of the land and
has not filed notice of his claim, his interest is automatically
extinguished by subdivision 5 of the Act as he would be barred
from bringing suit under subdivision 1. Thus, if literally read,
the Act operates to extinguish ancient claims without the need
to commence an action.
The case of B. W. & Leo Harris Company v. City of Hastings20
illustrates the above point. There plaintiff had an interest
in land which was less than 40 years old, but the source of his
title had been of record over 40 years. He was not in possession.
The defendant, claiming to have acquired title to the same land
by adverse possession more than 40 years before, had not filed
notice of its claim within the statutory period. The court, assum-
ing that the defendant had acquired fee simple title by adverse
possession, proceeded to discuss the applicability of the Minne-
sota Marketable Title Act. Since the defendant based his claim
of title upon an event-adverse possession-over 40 years old
and had neither filed a preserving notice, nor been in possession,8 0
the conclusive presumption of abandonment under subdivision 5
was applicable to him. Since plaintiff's interest was less than 40
years olds1 he could not have been barred from bringing an ac-
28. See B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49,
59 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1953), where the court said:
It is apparent from a reading of the statute that it was not
intended as a mere procedural device to limit the time for com-
mencing such action but was intended to bar the right itself for
subd. 5 provides a conclusive presumption that the claimant has
abandoned his right.
29. 240 Minn. 44, 59 N.W.2d 813 (1953).
30. The presumption of abandonment can be avoided if the claim-
ant is in possession. Mnqx. STAT. § 541.023 (6) (1967).
31. There may indeed be a question of why plaintiff's interest in
Harris was not deemed to be more than 40 years old when the action
was brought in 1950, since it was opposed to the city's claim of adverse
possession which purportedly arose in 1908. Apparently the court dis-
[Vol. 53:10041010
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tion by subdivision 1 and therefore subdivision 5 could not have
extinguished his claim as it had defendant's.32
The above illustrations suggest the dubious nature of the
Minnesota Act which renders it unreliable for uniform results.
In some situations the Act operates only as a statute of limi-
tations, barring only plaintiffs, while in others the Act ensures a
true marketable title by extinguishing old claims regardless of
whether such claims are asserted. Furthermore, when the claims
of two parties are of equal duration,3 3 and neither has filed a
tinguished between plaintiff's "source of title," which predated the
city's claim of adverse possession, and plaintiff's "claim of title" based
upon that source of title, which claim only dated back to 1930 when
plaintiff acquired the real estate. B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of
Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 46, 59 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1953). Thus, Harris
had until 1970 either to enter possession or to file notice before sub-
division 1 would preclude him from bringing the present action.
Why then, did the Wichelman court measure the age of Wichel-
man's condition from the date of its creation, 1897, rather than from the
date of Wichelman's acquisition, 1952, when it determined that he was
barred from asserting his claim because no preserving notice had been
filed? Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 96, 83 N.W.2d 800, 810(1957). At first impression, the application of the statute in Harris
seems inconsistent with the application in Wichelman-in the former
the court measured the age of plaintiff's claim from the date of his
acquisition, while in the latter the court measured the age of plaintiff's
claim from the date of the creation of the condition. However, since
Wichelman did not acquire any rights to the condition until 1952, it is
apparent that at the effective date of the Act, January 1, 1948, his
condition was already over 40 years old, and since no preserving no-
tice had been filed and the owners of the condition were not in posses-
sion at that time, a literal application of subdivision 5 automatically ex-
tinguished it. Thus the condition was arguably extinguished prior to
the time when Wichelman purportedly acquired it. So construed, the
application of the statute to the two cases is consistent. At any rate,
the important fact in determining whether the statute applies so as to
bar a claim under subdivision 1 or extinguish a claim under subdivision
5 should be the age of a party's claim rather than his source of title.
This would create potential straw man problems in that X could sell
his 39 year old claim to Y and Y would then have 40 years in which to
file. But if X knew that he could extend the filing period by such a
sale, he would presumably know of the need to file and could accom-
plish even more by filing his notice. Such an interpretation would not,
however, open the way for X to sell his 45 year old claim (with no pre-
serving notice or possession) to Y in an attempt to revive the claim and
give Y 40 years in which to file or gain appropriate possession, since
X's claim would have automatically been extinguished by a literal appli-
cation of subdivision 5 as soon as it had become over 40 years old.
32. For a discussion of Harris, see Wichelman v. Messner, 250
Minn. 88, 112-13, 83 N.E.2d 800, 820 (1957).
33. Subdivision 5 can still be operative, however, when the claims
are of unequal duration, and neither party is in possession or has filed
a preserving notice, since once the earlier claim becomes over 40 years
old, the latter would still be less than 40 years old, and subdivision 5
could operate without literally extinguishing both claims.
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preserving notice or is in possession, subdivision 5 cannot be ap-
plied to extinguish either claim and the fortuitous defendant
always prevails by virtue of the bar to the plaintiff under sub-
division 1. When one of the parties has either filed a preserving
notice or is in possession when the claim becomes 40 years old,
subdivision 5 can operate, making it irrelevant whether a suit
is brought or who is plaintiff or defendant.
III. THE MODEL MARKETABLE TITLE ACT-A CURE
The Model Marketable Title Act 34 provides that an unbroken
chain of title from the present back to the "root of title" will
extinguish interests created and existing prior to that root.
35
The root of title is the most recent transaction in the claimant's
chain which has been recorded at least 40 years prior to the time
marketability is being determined.36 A quitclaim deed, a pro-
bate decree, a quiet title decree, a sheriff's deed or a mortgage
may all serve as the root of title if recorded more than 40 years
from the time marketability is called into question.37 With cer-
tain exceptions,38 claims and interests existing prior to the root
of title are declared void.39
The operation of the Model Act may be illustrated by the
following hypothetical situation: 40 Suppose in 1899, 0 conveys
to X a 99 year lease which is then duly recorded. In 1900, 0
conveys a fee simple to A, the deed being recorded and contain-
ing a recitation that it is subject to X's lease. In 1925, A con-
veys to B, and in 1946, B conveys to C, both deeds being re-
corded, but neither mentioning the lease. Under the Model Act,
in 1965, if X had not filed a preserving notice of his lease,41 C's
34. For a copy of the text, see SIviEs & TAYLOR at 6-16 [The Model
Marketable Title Act is hereinafter cited as Model Act].
35. The Michigan Act, MtcH. CoMP. LAws § 565.101 (1967), and
the Model Act (section 1) added more than just the extinguishment of
ancient interests. They placed primary emphasis on the concept of
marketability. Thus they begin: "Any person, having the legal
capacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken chain of title of
record to any interest in land for forty years [or more], shall be deemed
to have marketable record title to such interest. .. ."
36. Model Act § 8 (e). The Michigan Act does not contain the same
concept, but has been interpreted by the Michigan Bar to encompass
the same meaning.
37. Smith, The New Marketable Title Act, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 712,
713 (1961).
38. See text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
39. Model Act § 3.
40. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 52-54.
41. Model Act § 4. In Michigan, however, the lease would still be
[Vol. 53:10041012
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title to Blackacre would be free and clear thereof. C's root of
title, the most recent transaction in his chain which is at least
40 years old, is the 1925 deed, and since that time he has had an
unbroken chain of title for at least 40 years. In 1986, C or his
successor will have as a new root of title the 1946 deed from B
to C, since it will be the most recent transaction in C's chain
which is at least 40 years old. Any claims and interests created
and existing prior to the recording of the 1946 deed will be
extinguished. Hence, the title becomes "cleansed" every time
40 years elapse from the recording of a transaction capable of
serving as a root of title.
The 1900 deed from 0 to A did not serve as the root of title
so as to extinguish the lease in 1940, since its reference to the
lease preserved it from extinguishment under an exception to the
Model Act for "interests and defects which are inherent in the
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed." 42
Assume, for example, that A conveyed a determinable fee simple
to B prior to the 40 year period, thus leaving a possibility of
reverter in A. If there have been no further conveyances, A's
possibility of reverter is not extinguished by the passage of 40
years, since it is contained in the deed of which such chain of
record title is formed. This is comparable to Wichelman,43 where
both plaintiff and defendant were claiming under the same deed.
Thus, the interest sought to be extinguished, which was either a
reverter or a condition subsequent, was inherent in the muni-
ments of which such chain of record title was formed-the 1897
deed-and would not have been nullified under the Model Act.
This seems a more equitable result. If Messner would have
searched the record, he would have found the condition recited
in the 1897 deed, the most recent transaction of record. Since
marketable title acts are supposed to promote reliance on the rec-
ord rather than on extraneous facts, conditions and interests
which clearly appear should not be extinguished.4 4 Although
this may preserve old claims, such a preservation occurs any-
way if notice is seasonably filed.4 5 In fact, if the school district
effective, since MicH. Corvp. LAws § 565.104 (1967) excepts from ex-
tinguishment the rights of lessees and their successors.
42. Model Act § 2(a). See also MIaE. ComP. LAws § 565.101
(1967).
43. 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
44. See McH. Comp. LAWs § 565.106 (1967); Model Act § 9; Aigler,
A Supplement to "Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts"--1951-
1957, 56 MICH. L. REv. 225, 233 (1957); Bayse, supra note 2, at 268.
45. Marketable title acts have a co-equal purpose of extinguishing
stale claims. Such a purpose normally cannot be accomplished as long
19691 1013
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in Wichelman had filed a preserving notice prior to the record-
ing of the deed, but after it had been executed, the interest
presumably would have been kept alive by a recording older
than the deed, even though it could not be preserved by the deed.
The Model Act contains other interests to which market-
able record title is subject. Interests are preserved by the
filing of notice within the 40 year period following the effective
date of the root of title or by continuous possession by the same
owner for at least 40 years.46 Marketable title is also subject
to "the rights of any person arising from a period of adverse
possession or use, which was in whole or in part subsequent to
the effective date of the root of title. ' 47 Finally, the Model Act
does not extinguish rights of reversioners in leases, easements
which are clearly observable, and interests of the United States.48
IV. MINNESOTA ACT-INTERESTS AFFECTED
A. TTLE
The Wichelman court determined that the word "title" in
the phrase "claim of title based upon a source of title" meant
fee simple title.49 Thus the court felt that the only persons de-
serving of the Act's protection were those claiming fee simple
title. Some commentators agree that the Act protects only such
interests.50 However, since the Act was amended in 1959 de-
fining "source of title" as a fee simple,51 it may well be argued
that Wichelman. does not foreclose the possibility of interpreting
the amended version of the Minnesota Act to include in its
protection less than fee simple interests, as long as the claimant's
chain of title can be traced back to a fee simple source of title
as the exception herein discussed is in force. For this very reason, the
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.49 (A) (Page's Supp. 1967) provides that
"possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry or powers of termination
for breach of condition subsequent, which interests are inherent in the
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed and which
have existed for forty years or more, shall be preserved and kept effec-
tive only [by filing]," since a time limitation on these interests is desir-
able. See Smith, supra note 37, at 719.
46. ModelAct §§ 2(b), 4(a).
47. Id. § 2(c).
48. Id. §§ 2(e), 6.
49. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 105, 83 N.W.2d 800, 815
(1957).
50. See, e.g., Snv~s & TAYLOR at 351-52; Note, The Indiana Mar-
ketable Title Act of 1963: A Survey, 40 IND. L.J. 21, 26-27 (1964); Note,
Marketable Title Legislation-A Model Act for Iowa, 47 IowA L. REV.
389, 397 (1962).
51. Mum. STAT. § 541.023 (7) (1967).
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of record at least 40 years. For example, assume 0 conveys a
fee simple to A in 1920. In 1930, A grants B a life estate with a
remainder to C. Assume also that X has a hostile claim based
on a transaction which occurred in 1915. In 1960 both B and C
are protected against an adverse claim of X even though B's
claim is less than fee simple, since his source of title is a fee
simple of record over 40 years.
Even though the Minnesota Act may be interpreted as pro-
tecting less than fee simple interests, this should be made
clear in the Act. At present the Act is ambiguous as to which
types of interests receive its protection.
The purpose of marketable title acts should not only be to
clear titles of those persons claiming a fee simple, but to make
any interest in land marketable. 52  If the acts are limited to
fees, a title examiner searching something less cannot rely on
records covering a mere 40 years.5 3
The Model Act avoids this confusion by providing that the
holders of "any interest" shall be deemed to have marketable
title to "such interest."54 Under this language it is possible for
estates and interests other than fees simple to be cleared of
old claims that have not been preserved. Under the Model Act, if
a life tenant can trace his record interest back to a root of title
at least 40 years old, he can claim the benefit of the Act to pro-
tect his life interest.55 This provision renders a greater number
of titles marketable and lessens the burden of title search for
interests less than fee simple.
B. EASEMENTS
The Wichelman court stated that party walls, utility ease-
ments, and right-of-way easements are not extinguished by the
Act when they involve "actual occupancy or use of part or all
of the real property,"5 6 since they are impliedly exempted under
52. Such interests include easements, profits & prendre, licenses,
life estates, reversions and remainders, and conditional or determinable
fees and their attendant future interests both legal and equitable, pos-
sessory and nonpossessory.
53. See SnVEs & TAYLOR at 297; Bayse, Trends and Progress-The
Marketable Title Acts, 47 IowA L. REv. 261, 268 (1961).
54. Model Act § 1. See also IND. STAT. ANx. § 56-1101 (Burn's
Supp. 1968); MIcH. Comp. LAws § 565.101 (1967); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 5301.48 (Page's Supp. 1967).
55. See Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?
53 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 64 (1967); Comment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 841,
848 (1966).
56. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 103, 83 N.W.2d 800, 814
(1957).
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the possession exception of the Act.57 The court, however, lacks
support in this approach. The Act does not expressly exclude
easements from its filing requirements, and furthermore, since
easements are nonpossessory interests, 58 they should not be ex-
cepted under the possession exception. 59
Easements are excepted from -the filing provisions of most
marketable title acts60 and the Minnesota Act should also provide
for limited exceptions. Easements 61 are likely to go unrecorded
either because the owner is ignorant of the necessity of record-
ing,6 2 feeling its use is adequate notice, or because the easement
arose by prescription.63 However, an exception for all ease-
ments tends to weaken the beneficial effects of an act which
otherwise frees land from remotely created interests. It would
seem desirable to exempt clearly observable easements,0 4 such
as roads and ditches, since a vendee can discover these potential
defects in his title without examining the record. Such an ex-
ception would protect that easement-holder who assumes his
visible use is adequate notice and that filing is not necessary.
It would also make treatment of visible easements consistent
with general property law which provides that they retain their
priority even though unrecorded.65
On the other hand, holders of non-observable easements,
such as drains and pipelines, should be subjected to the notice
filing requirement because of the difficulty in ascertaining the
existence of such interests by visual examination. Also, these
holders are generally large and sophisticated businesses knowl-
57. Mnux. STAT. § 541.023(6) (1967).
58. 5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (b) (1932).
59. See 51 Mn. L. REv. 355, 358-59 (1966).
60. For some representative statutes which except easements see
Barnett, supra note 55, at 72-74.
61. See Payne, The Crisis in Conveyancing, 19 Mo. L. REv. 214, 231
(1954); Comment, 51 M.iNN. L. REv. 355, 358 (1966).
62. This justification is analagous to the justification behind the
exception in the Model Act for possession; viz, the person in possession
is not likely to know of threats to his title and of the necessity of re-
cording notice. See Comment, supra note 55, at 856.
63. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 72.
64. See Model Act § 6. The Florida Act, which exempts easements
"in use," is felt to be too broad. "It removes from the operation of the
act a varied and ubiquitous group of interests without so much as a
requirement that the easement be observable." Boyer & Shapo, Flori-
da's Marketable Title Act: Prospects and Problems, 18 U. Mrmn L. REv.
103, 106 (1963). The Michigan, Ohio and Indiana acts except any ease-
ment the existence of which "is evidenced by the location beneath, upon,
or above any part of the land" whether or not observable. See Barnett,
supra note 55, at 72-74.
65. See Mnb . SmT. § 507.34, comment 12 (1947).
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edgeable of the law and its requirements for filing notice. Such
a treatment of these easements would also be consistent with
general property law which provides that when a non-observ-
able easement is unrecorded it does not have priority over a
subsequent purchaser for value who had no actual notice
thereof.60
C. MORTGAGES
The Wicheimn court exempted from the requirement of
filing notice those mortgages which are represented by a current
active relationship with the fee owner.67 But such a construc-
tion is questionable, since the Act's use of the word "liens" seems
to encompass mortgages.68
Although there is a recent trend to long-term mortgages,
they seldom extend beyond 40 years.69 Consequently, there is
no need for excepting mortgages from the Act. It would not
only be unnecessary to file a preserving notice for most mort-
gages, since their duration is less than 40 years, but mortgagees
holding the relatively few mortgages of over 40 years would
tend to be rather sophisticated institutions which could reason-
ably be required to know of the need to file. Thus, considering
the need to examine the entire record for abnormally long-term
mortgages,70 it is arguable that no mortgages of any kind should
be excepted from the operations of the Act.
D. REVERSIONS AND REM INDERS FOLLOWING LIFE ESTATES
AND LEASES
The Wichelman court concluded that the title to be pro-
tected by the Act was a fee simple.71 Thus, reversions and
remainders are not currently subject to extinguishment. A life
tenant or a lessee, whose interests have lasted over 40 years,
cannot claim that his remainderman or reversioner loses his in-
terest for failure to file. Title searches beyond the statutory
period are therefore necessary, since many life estates and long-
term leases continue beyond 40 years.72
66. See bImx. STAT. ANN. § 507.34 (1947) and related annotations.
67. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 104, 83 N.W.2d 800,
814-15 (1957).
68. Miri. STAT. § 541.023(1) (1967).
69. Payne, supra note 61, at 226.
70. Snmss & TAYLOR at 356.
71. See text accompanying notes 49-56 supra.
72. The most common examples arising from the court's language
involving reversions and remainders are leases and life estates, and it
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Similarly, the Model Act fails to extinguish the interest of a
lessor or his reversioner on the expiration of a lease.73 This
exception is justified on the grounds that a lessor, not being in
possession, might not be informed of hostile claims and might
reasonably overlook the requirement of filing notice.74 How-
ever, this justification applies with equal force to many other
future interest holders, such as reversioners following life estates
and persons with rights of entry or possibilities of reverter
whose interests are not excepted by the Model Act.7 5 A better
justification is that long-term leases, which are generally com-
mercial transactions and thus much more common and important
than noncommercial future interests, deserve protection.7 6 How-
ever, since nonessential exceptions operate to nullify many of
the basic purposes of a marketable title act, it seems desirable to
remove even this exception. 77 As long as the owner of a re-
version following a lease is allowed to file notice of his claim,
his interest will not be extinguished after 40 years. Long-term
lessors, similar to long-term mortgagees,78 will usually be so-
phisticated business concerns which know of the need to file.
E. THE PROBLEM OF WILD DEEDS
The Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected the contention
that the grantee of a stray or interloping deed might become an
absolute owner, stating that "the statute does not operate to pro-
vide a foundation for a new title.''79 Under the literal terms of
the Act, however, this could easily occur. If a non-possessing
owner has failed to file notice, he is barred from disturbing the
possession of the vendee of an interloping conveyance of record
is true that reversions and remainders following these interests cannot
be extinguished by the Act. However, this general rule is not applica-
ble to all reversions and remainders. Assume, for example, that A
conveys a life estate to X with a remainder to Y. A also conveys a fee
simple to B who enters possession. After 40 years, if Y has not filed
notice of his claim, his interest will be cut off by B's fee simple interest.
See Comment, Marketable Title Acts, 10 ALA. L. REV. 415, 424 (1958).
73. Model Act §§ 2(e), 6. MicH. CorM. LAws § 565.104 (1967)
contains the same exception.
74. Snvms & TAYLOR at 357.
75. Note, The Indiana Marketable Title Act of 1963: A Survey,
40 IND. L. J. 21, 35 (1964).
76. Id.
77. Note, Marketable Title Legisation-A Model Act for Iowa, 47
IowA L. REV. 389, 411 (1962).
78. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
79. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 112, 83 N.W.2d 800, 819
(1957).
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of at least 40 years. For example, assume that in 1925 0 con-
veys a fee simple to X who immediately records. In 1926 A, a
stranger to the land, executes a warranty deed and conveys to
B, who does not examine title but who immediately records.
In 1966, if X is not in possession and attempts to assert his rights
to the land, he will be barred by subdivision 1 of the Act and un-
der subdivision 5 will be presumed to have abandoned his in-
terest. B will then have title free and clear of X's interest.
Certainly it is rare that someone sells the land of another, or that
the owner sells it twice,80 but wild deeds often arise in mistaken
land descriptions. Competing chains of title result where land
is sold by a common grantor in which the descriptions in the
deeds overlap and where the grantor conveys his land by war-
ranty deed to one person and by quitclaim deed to another.
In 195981 the Minnesota Legislature attempted to solve the
wild deed problem by amending the Minnesota Act to require
that when an instrument purports to convey a fee simple title
from a person who was not the record owner of the real estate,
two conditions must be fulfilled within the 40 year period after
the instrument's recording to render the conveyance a source of
title: (1) another conveyance must be recorded which transfers
a fee simple title from the first grantee, and (2) there can be no
recorded conveyance of any interest by the person who was
record owner immediately before the 40 year period.82 Although
this provision is a step in the right direction, it does not go far
enough. The first condition could be satisfied by a conveyance
to a "straw" man. Furthermore, if there was an inconsistent
conveyance under the second condition, unless a tract index was
used such conveyance would not appear in the chain of title of
the grantee in the second "stray" chain 83 and thus a purchaser
from such grantee would not be put on notice by the record.
The Model Act handles the problem more satisfactorily.
Marketable record title becomes subject to any interest arising
out of a title transaction recorded subsequent to the root of title,
provided, however, than an interest which has previously been
80. This occurs in the following situation: In 1925 0 sells Black-
acre to A, and in 1926 0 sells the same land to B. Under the Model
Act, B will have "marketable record title" in 1966, thereby divesting
the senior grantee of his title. The same type of analysis may be
applied in this "double chain" situation as was applied in the "wild"
deed hypothetical.
81. Ch. 492, § 1 [1959] Minn. Laws 665.
82. MnlN. STAT. § 541.023 (7) (1967): "The purpose ... is to limit
the effect of erroneous descriptions or accidental conveyances."
83. See SnIss & TAYLOR at 340.
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extinguished may not be revived by such recording.8 4 If a wild
deed is recorded, the title it creates, although becoming market-
able after 40 years elapse, is subject to any interest which is
recorded during the 40 year period. For example, assume X
conveyed to Y in 1920, the deed immediately being recorded.
In 1925 A conveyed the same land to B. Assume further that
in 1930 each grantee made another conveyance, Y to Z and B to
C, each party recording his respective deed. By 1965 both Z and
C would have marketable record titles, their chains being more
than 40 years in length.8 5 Each chain is subject to "any title
transaction which has been recorded subsequent to the effective
date of the root of title from which the unbroken chain of title
of record is started."8' 6 Therefore, neither chain of title extin-
guishes the other, and common-law principles will be applied to
settle the rights of the parties.8 7 Furthermore, this provision,
in effect, imposes the second condition of subdivision 7 of the
Minnesota Act-that in order to prevent formation of a new title
based upon a wild deed, an interest must be conveyed by the
senior grantor during the 40 year period beginning with the
second or "stray" chain of title. Thus, the same criticism applied
against the Minnesota Act, in this regard, may be applied against
the Model Act.
Notwithstanding such criticisms, both titles in both chains
are marketable record titles in that they are free of ancient
claims. The result is consistent with the purpose of marketable
title acts, which is to extinguish those claims which are over
40 years old and which have not been preserved by filing. The
acts do not purport to deal with the quality of title conveyed by
the root. It is necessary only that the interest is purportedly
conveyed by an instrument denominated as the root of title.88
84. Model Act § 2 (d).
85. If the 1925 conveyance from A to B falsely stated that X had
died intestate and A is his sole heir at law, then the 1925 conveyance
warrants an inference that X has been divested of his interest pursuant
to section 1 of the Model Act, and Y cannot thereafter claim the bene-
fits of a marketable record title.
86. Model Act § 2(d).
87. See Simes, The Improvement of Conveyancing: Recent De-
velopments, 34 OKLA. BAR Ass'N J. 2357, 2362 (1963).
88. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 57. This result exemplifies the
distinction between marketable record title as provided by the Model
Act and derivatives thereof, and a commercially marketable title in
which the former is cleansed of only pre-root interests and defects,
while failing to clear the title of post root claims and interests. See
Note, supra note 75, at 28.
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F. POSSESSION
The Minnesota Act, along with most others,8 9 contains a pro-
vision excepting persons in possession of real estate from the
requirement of filing notice of their interests.90 The existence
of such provision necessitates an inspection of real estate by
potential vendees. Although the utility of the Act is thereby
diminished, making it necessary to go outside the record to
search for title defects,91 the exception seems justified in that
possession is ample evidence of a possessor's claim and is almost
always investigated. Also, persons in possession are normally
not aware of any need to file notice thereof.92
Even though a possession exception is justifiable, the extent
of possession needed to invoke the Act's protection, as deter-
mined by the Minnesota Supreme Court, is such that persons
may be precluded from benefiting by the exception if unable to
prove continuous possession for the necessary period of time. In
B.W. & Leo Harris Company v. City of Hastings9" the court
determined that the possession required to be exempt from filing
under the Act must be "present, actual, open, and exclusive and
must be inconsistent with the title of the person who is pro-
tected .... ,4 The court determined that since the defendant
had not filed notice, and was not in continuous possession from
the time the statute took effect until the time the action was
commenced,9 r his claim of title was extinguished by the statute.96
89. E.g., Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.51 (Page's Supp. 1967);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.15 (1966).
90. MnIN. STAT. § 541.023(6) (1967). The original version of the
Minnesota Act protected the rights of an owner in possession by ex-
pressly excluding from its scope "any action commenced by any person
who is in possession of the real estate involved as owner ... ." Ch.
124, § 1, [1945] Minn. Laws 182. This is also the form of possessory
exception provided in Wis. STAT. ANw. § 893.15(4) (1966). The Wiscon-
sin exception was interpreted in Herzog v. Bujniewicz, 32 Wis. 2d 26,
145 N.W.2d 124 (1966).
91. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 63; Comment, 10 AA. L. REv. 415
(1958) 415; Comment, supra note 55, at 856.
92. See Tulane, Title to Real Property-Thirty Year Limitations
Statute, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 258; Comment, supra note 55, at 856.
93. 240 Minn. 44, 59 N.W.2d 813 (1953).
94. Id. at 49, 59 N.W.2d at 816-17. The court said at note 5 that,
"this is the same type of possession which constitutes constructive no-
tice under the real estate recording act .... "
95. It should be pointed out that while the Hastings court held
that in order for the city to invoke the possession exception of sub-
division 6, thereby avoiding the conclusive presumption of abandonment
of subdivision 5, it must show continuous possession from the effective
date of the Act to the commencement of the action, the necessary pos-
session need not always run from the effective date of the act. In
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has also denied easement holders
the benefit of the possession exception by concluding that the
easements involved were not manifested by actual and contin-
uous use or occupancy. 97
A harsh ramification of the Minnesota court's standard
of continuous possession is that a non-filing holder of a 40 year
old easement could lose it if he leaves possession for only a brief
period of time. Assume, for example, that in 1920 a gas company
has an easement for an underground pipeline granted by X. The
easement has been in constant use since 1920, but no preserving
notice has ever been filed.98 In 1969, as a result of a gas
explosion, a portion of the pipeline is destroyed. Should the gas
company attempt to repair the pipeline, and should X refuse to
allow the company entry to do so, the gas company arguably
could be precluded from establishing its right to the easement
under a literal continuous possession standard.99
Hastings the city's claim was already over 40 years old on January 1,
1948, the effective date of the Act. Thus, in order to invoke the posses-
sion exception it was necessary to be in possession at the effective date.
But where a party's claim does not become 40 years old until after
January 1, 1948, the claimant need only commence his possession prior
to the time his claim will become 40 years old. See id. at 50, 59
N.W.2d at 816-17.
96. Id. at 50, 59 N.W.2d at 817. The evidence of possession was
that the defendant erected a skating rink and warming house for use
during the winter; defendant's park commissioner cleaned up the tract
every spring and after certain celebrations; defendant's employees hauled
dirt from the city streets to the tract; and a baseball backstop was
erected by the defendant's employees on the tract.
97. See United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary Temple, 257 Minn.
273, 277, 101 N.W.2d 208, 211 (1960), where the court held that "[o]nly
right-of-way easements 'which are manifested by actual use or occu-
pancy' are protected [by subdivision 3] if the requirement of filing
notice is not met." The evidence was clear that the easement was not
in use during the critical period. See also Caroga Realty Co. v. Tap-
per, 274 Minn. 164, 143 N.W.2d 215 (1966), noted in 51 MNN. L. REv.
355 (1966), where the court held evidence showing that a right-of-way
easement which was used by the tenant's package customers for parking
when there was no room at the curb was not sufficient to establish
possession under subdivision 6 of the Act because the possession was not
continuous.
98. This easement is not excepted from the notice filing require-
ment since it was not clearly observable from physical evidence of its
use.
99. If the claim is based upon an instrument, event, or transaction
which was 40 years old on January 1, 1948, the claimant's possession
must have begun at least by that date and must continue until the
action is commenced; if it is based upon an instrument, event or
transaction which becomes or became 40 years old after January 1, 1948,
the claimant's possession must begin or have begun at the end of the 40
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The standard of possession should be redefined and relaxed.
Possession should be such that a reasonable man investigating
the property at any time is put on notice that the land is being
used. As applied to easements, this standard should require only
that the easement be clearly observable. 100 Continuity of use
seems an undesirable standard.
G. FIIJNG PRoVISIoNs
The Minnesota Act has presented a number of ambiguities
in reference to the manner and effect of filing notice. The
effect of initially filing notice is unclear. The Act requires that
a notice of the claim or interest be filed within 40 years after
the execution or occurrence of the instrument, transaction, or
event by which it was created. No provision is made for re-
recording. Thus, a holder of an interest can file his notice one
day after his interest was created, 1 1 and, although the filing
will probably not be effective indefinitely,10 2 it will prevent the
extinguishment of certain claims for periods far in excess of 40
years. 0 3
The Michigan and Model Acts present the best approaches
to the problem of notice duration. The Michigan Act, in effect,
requires filing every 40 years by providing that notice, to be
effective, must be recorded within the 40 year period represent-
ing the title holder's chain of title.'04 The Model Act requires a
filing of notice within the 40 year period beginning with the
effective date of the record title holder's root of title. 0 5
year period and must continue until the action is commenced. See
B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49, 59 N.W.2d
813, 816 (1953).
100. See text accompanying note 64, supra.
101. See Mm. STAT. § 541.023 (1) (Supp. 1967).
102. The interest probably will not be perpetuated indefinitely,
since the Act provides that it ". . does not extend the right to com-
mence any action beyond the date at which such right would be ex-
tinguished by any other statute." MIN. STAT. § 541.023(3) (Supp. 1967).
Presumably the other statute referred to is MINN. STAT. § 500.20 (1947)
which provides that conditions or restrictions which have become nomi-
nal may be disregarded.
103. This result has been criticized. See SIMEs & TAYLOR at 335;
P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TrrTLEs § 176 (1953); Comment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 841, 859 (1966).
For the view of a commentator who feels that the period may be
limited even though the language does not expressly provide, see
Rhode, Illinois Marketable Title Act, 39 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 49, 53
(1962).
104. MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 565.103 (1967).
105. Model Act § 4(a).
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Another undesirable feature of the Minnesota Act's filing
provisions is that the deed of conveyance does not act as notice.
This is evidenced by the fact that in Wichelman, the claim which
was barred was based on the same deed that the record title
holder relied on for his chain of title. If the deed had been
deemed a notice, the plaintiff would have prevailed. 00 Thus,
under the current Act, in order to be entitled to bring an action
on a claim over 40 years old, a separate "notice" must be filed,
since the ordinary deed does not meet the statutory require-
ments of a "notice."
While allowing a deed to be notice of indefinite duration
would certainly frustrate the purpose of a marketable title act,
the same is also true whenever a separate notice is effective
indefinitely, especially when that separate notice is filed simul-
taneously with the deed. Thus, under the present Minnesota
Act there is no logical reason for distinguishing a deed reciting a
condition from a separate notice.
The Model Act obviates the need for filing a notice in addi-
tion to the deed by providing in effect that interests inherent
in the muniments from which a root of title is formed are suffi-
cient notice of such interests.107 Assuming that Minnesota re-
stricts the duration of a preserving notice, then the only circum-
stance under which a deed should ever be given the effect of a
notice is if the Model Act's "root of title" approach is adopted.
A further problem with the Minnesota Act is the absence of
any provision for late filing. Undoubtedly there are a number of
claims for which no notice has been filed which could be lost if
their holder leaves possession and the time for filing has
passed. 08 Minnesota should remedy this problem by making
late filing effective to preserve the claimant's interest so long
as there has been no intervening transaction recorded. 1 9
A final difficulty with the Minnesota Act involves its in-
ability to provide for filing by a wide range of persons. The Act
provides for execution and verification of notice only by the
claimant, his agent or attorney.1 10 However, in cases involving
106. The same situation occurred in United Parking Stations, Inc.
v. Calvary Temple, 257 Minn. 273, 101 N.W.2d 208 (1960), where the
interest reserved in the deed was an easement.
107. Model Act § 2 (a).
108. See P. BAYsE, supra note 103, at ch. 9.
109. See, e.g., REV. ONT. STAT. ch. 186, § 2(a) (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.15 (1966).
110. Mum. STAT. ANN. § 541.023(1) (Supp. 1967).
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contingent or future interests it is sometimes impossible to know
or ascertain the person who will be entitled to the land at a
future date. Consequently, unborn or unascertained persons
may be unable to protect their interests. Minnesota should
expressly provide for persons to file notice of their own interests
or on behalf of any person who is under a disability or who is
unborn or unascertained at the time necessary for filing.111
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Minnesota Act has done much to reduce the
burdens in examining title, it is still far from accomplishing its
stated purpose of preventing ancient interests from fettering the
marketability of real estate." 2 The confusing format of the Act
-the limitations concept of subdivision 1 and the marketability
concept of subdivision 5--raises much doubt as to when the Act
operates only as a statute of limitations and when it operates
to render titles marketable. In addition, the numerous implied
exceptions to the Act prevent substantial reliance on a 40 year
title examination without allowing the title examiner the bene-
fit of knowing which exceptions to search. Finally, the notice
filing system is replete with drawbacks. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court, attempting to solve some of the problems, has
confused the Act even more. It is time, therefore, for the Min-
nesota Legislature to repeal the Minnesota Act in favor of a form
of the Model Marketable Title Act.
111. See P. BAYSE, supra note 103, at § 176; Comment, 10 ALA. L.
REv. 415, 425 (1958).
112. ANm. STAT. § 541.023 (5) (1967).
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